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ABSTRACT:
The trend of increased use of unsecured debt by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
is continuing. Many real estate practitioners and academics are observing this new
phenomenon with great interest. Two important questions in this regard are why is this
happening and what does it mean for the REIT Industry? On one hand, REIT
management claims that unsecured debt has a lower cost of capital and provides
greater operational flexibility than secured debt. On the other hand, the use of
unsecured debt introduces several unique constraints on REIT management, and may
be a signal of reduced growth opportunities for the REIT.
This thesis explores the equity market's reaction to these debt offerings, the cause of
this reaction, and the determinants of the debt issue's yield at issuance. Negative
average abnormal returns are observed in a sample of twenty three initial public offering
events during the five day period leading up to the offering date (days -4 to 0), indicating
a negative market reaction. These negative abnormal returns are most closely
correlated with the ratio of market value to book value of the REIT, which serves as a
proxy for the market's perception of a REITs growth opportunities. In addition,
regression analysis using a sample of thirty two unsecured debt IPOs reveals the two
most significant determinants of IPO pricing to be the term structure of interest rates
and the percentage of unencumbered assets dedicated to repayment of the debt.
These results support the hypothesis that REIT's choice to issue unsecured debt
provides information to the market concerning that REITs future growth prospects. In
particular, we conjecture that REITs that choose to finance with unsecured debt are
signaling to the market a reduction in firm future growth opportunities. Our results
indicate that those firms with the largest perceived growth potential, as indicated by the
market value to book value ratio, suffered the largest negative abnormal stock price
returns.
Thesis Supervisor: Timothy J. Riddiough
Title: Assistant Professor of Real Estate Finance
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Two prominent features differentiate the REIT structure from the typical
corporate structure. The REIT is tax exempt, and the REIT is required to pay out
95% of its taxable income through dividends. Because of the operating nature of
REITs and the required 95% dividend payout, REITs must continually access the
capital markets to fund ongoing acquisition and capital expenditures.
Until recently, REITs have relied almost exclusively on equity or traditional
secured debt financing to fund ongoing capital needs. Following the expansion
of equity issuance among REITs and a lower interest rate environment, REITs
are increasingly accessing capital by issuing unsecured debt rather than through
the equity and the traditional mortgage market.
This thesis explores several issues concerning the forces motivating REITs to
access the unsecured debt market versus the equity and traditional mortgage
markets for funding. An event study is used to document market reaction to
unsecured debt issuance, as observed through stock price change, to
hypothesize about the signals management may provide the marketplace
concerning long run growth prospects of the REIT. In addition, regression
analysis is used to study the determinants of the abnormal returns as well as the
determinants of unsecured debt pricing. Independent variables for the
regressions include macroeconomic factors, financial ratios, and unsecured debt
covenants.
The Equity REIT Market: Historical Trends
The asset value of the 176 equity REITs, as reported by NAREIT, reached
approximately $62 billion by the end of 1995. Equity REITs began a rapid growth
period in 1992; however, in 1994, the pace of equity REIT IPOs slowed
significantly. A number of potential REITs that were in the IPO pipeline were
forced to postpone or cancel their plans to go public.
Re-Emergence of Private Capital
By mid 1994, the perception that the real estate cycle had bottomed-out brought
about an increased availability of both private debt and equity capital. Owners
were no longer forced to access the public markets as a last ditch
recapitalization strategy. Many were then able to refinance existing mortgages
with private debt. In addition, as more capital entered the market, property prices
were bid up, thus eliminating the arbitrage opportunities that the REITs had
exploited in the early 1990's. As property prices were bid up as a result of
increased competition from the private market and from other REITs, growth
potential for REITs began to decline.
REIT's Changing Relationship to Small Cap Stocks
This decline in growth is demonstrated through REIT's changing relationship
with small-cap stocks. Until recently, REIT stocks behaved like small-cap stocks
and displayed many of the same characteristics, including high growth potential,
small turnover ratios, lower institutional investor participation and a relatively
small following among security analysts.' In 1990 the correlation coefficient of
Equity REIT returns to the Wilshire small Cap Stock Index was approximately
.85, but by the end of 1995, as growth potential declined, it had fallen to about
.45 (see Exhibit 1A on page 6).
Sagalyn, L. B., 1996, "Institutional Options: Publicly Traded REITs and Privately Held Real Estate Investments,"
NAREIT Publication, 10.
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REIT Use of Unsecured Debt
REITs are required to pay out 95% of net taxable income in the form of
dividends to retain their tax exempt status. This limits REIT's ability to internally
generate capital for portfolio expansion and capital improvements on existing
properties. Since 1993, equity REITs have increasingly turned to unsecured
debt, rather than secured debt or equity to fund capital needs. The REIT
industry is on track to match 1995 unsecured debt issuance levels, which
exceeded $2 billion (see Exhibit 1B on page 8).
What forces are motivating REITs to fund capital requirements with unsecured
debt rather than traditional secured debt or equity? REIT management claims
that unsecured debt provides a lower cost of capital and greater operational
flexibility. We will explore the validity of this first argument in terms of existing
theory and literature related to REIT capital structure by first documenting the
market reaction to REIT unsecured debt issuance, and then isolating those
factors driving the market reaction. We will examine the extent to which
unsecured debt affords management a greater degree of operational flexibility
through an examination of the restrictive covenants in REIT unsecured debt
IPOs.
Theoretical Motivation for REITs use of Unsecured Debt
Three areas of capital structure research and theory will be explored to explain
the market reaction to unsecured debt issuance in terms of the signaling
hypothesis; corporate capital structure under taxation, agency conflicts, and
asymmetric information.
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Corporate Capital Structure under Taxation
Modigliani and Miller in "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment (1958)," started the thinking on modern capital structure
theory. Modigliani and Miller's first proposition (MM I) argues that, in a
marketplace without frictions or taxes, firm value is unaffected by capital
structure.2 This argument is based on the assumption that investors can
effectively undo the effects of corporate leverage by borrowing at the investor
level.
Modigliani and Miller's second proposition (MM 11) states that any increase in
expected return is exactly offset by an increase in risk and is reflected through a
higher required return on equity. In an efficient market, stock price per share will
not change under different capital structures. Cash flows will be discounted at
an appropriately higher discount rate to compensate for any change in the equity
risk. With minimal debt levels, the relationship between return on equity and
debt is approximately linear. The required rate of return on the debt, however,
will increase at a rate exceeding the linear relationship at some point where debt
holders demand to be compensated for high marginal increases in risk levels.
This risk comes through an increased probability of financial distress
Modigliani and Miller, argue that capital structure does not matter in an efficient
marketplace without taxes and that raising capital through debt at lower interest
rates does not reduce the firm's weighted average cost of capital. However, a
later work by Modigliani and Miller in "Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to
the Electric Utilities Industry (1966),"sargues that firms can increase their value
2 Modigliani, F. and M. Miller, 1958, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,"
American Economic Review, 53, 261-297.
3 Miller, M. and F. Modigliani, 1966, "Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utilities Industry, 1954-
1957," American Economic Review, 56, 333-391.
through the use of debt by creating a tax shield. In an effort to maximize firm
value, firms should borrow as much as possible.
In a later paper titled "Debt and Taxes (1977),"4 Miller contradicted this earlier
conclusion.
The Relative Advantage of Debt
1< (1 - Tpe) /(1 - Tp)* ( -Tc)
Based on differences between the tax rate on capital gains (Tp) and the tax rate
on interest income (Tpe), Miller hypothesizes that the debt holder must be
compensated for the higher taxes paid on interest income versus the taxes paid
on capital gains. Miller describes the optimal corporate debt level to exist at an
equilibrium between aggregate supply and demand. This equilibrium is
achieved when corporate savings resulting from the debt tax shield equals the
additional taxes paid by the debt holders. Beyond this point, a firm benefits by
taking on additional debt. This hypothesis, however, addresses the aggregate
debt levels of firms, not debt levels on the individual firm level.
Modigliani and Miller, and Miller base their arguments for optimal corporate debt
level based on the value of a tax shield. The REIT structure, however, is not
taxed at the corporate level and therefore has no use for a tax shield. In fact,
based on the relative advantage of debt as presented by Miller, REITs would
have a relative disadvantage from using debt. This finding is consistent with
S.C. Myers and R. A. Brealy who conclude that "for companies that do not
expect to use the corporate tax shield, there is a moderate tax disadvantage."5
4 Miller, M., 1977, "Debt and Taxes," Journal of Finance, 32, 261-275.
5 Brealy, R.A. and S.C. Myers, 1991, "Principles of Corporate Finance, Fourth Edition," McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 433.
Agency Conflicts
A firm's future growth potential is a product of that firm's future positive
investment opportunities as well as the likelihood the firm will act on those
opportunities in an optimal manner. A firm which has included risky debt in its
capital structure, as argued by Myers in "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," 6
effectively splits the benefits from positive NPV projects between equity and
bondholders. When debt levels are sufficiently high, bondholders capture a
greater portion of the benefits from a positive NPV investment. As a result,
equity holders and management will be motivated to make sub-optimal
investment decisions through underinvestment in positive NPV projects and
through asset substitution.
A highly leveraged firm essentially owns a call option on corporate assets. The
extent to which this call option is in the money is a determinant of a firm's
motivation to make optimal investment decisions. If shareholders are left with an
out the money call option, any investment which does not sufficiently raise the
value of the call option will not be undertaken. Positive NPV projects will be
rejected, despite the fact they will increase overall firm value, if the benefits of
investment are disproportionately allocated to the bondholders.
An at the money or out of the money call option increases in value as the
underlying asset's return becomes more volatile. Thus, a firm with a sufficiently
high level of risky debt can increase shareholder value by increasing the
volatility of cash flows. Riskier assets will replace safer investments in an effort
to increase volatility and call option value. To the extent that asset substitution
benefits shareholders, a bondholder's in the money put option will suffer.
Additionally, with increased asset volatility, the likelihood of financial distress
increases, further eroding the bondholders position.
6 Myers, S.C., 1977, "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-175.
Myers claims agency conflicts can be controlled by including less debt in a firm's
capital structure, restrictive covenants in its indenture agreement, and by
shortening the maturity of debt. The market reaction to an unsecured debt
offering may therefore be contingent on the debt levels of the issuing firm, the
degree to which the restrictive covenants protect shareholder's interests, and the
length of the debt maturity
Asymmetric Information
Myers and Majluf7 explore the effects of asymmetric information and the signals
about a firm's growth potential that management provides the market through its
method for raising capital. Myers and Majluf8 hypothesize that when managers
have information that investors do not have (asymmetric information),
management will act in the best interests of existing shareholders. In this case,
management with positive information concerning the firm's investment
prospects will seek to retain that upside for the existing shareholders by first
issuing risk free debt, then risky debt, and lastly equity.
When equity is used to raise additional capital, the market assumes
management is acting in the best interests of existing shareholders, and will
adjust share value down. In support of this claim, Myers' and Majluf's event
study results indicate that "(w)hen managers have superior information, and
stock is issued to finance investment, stock price will fall, other things equal. If
the firm issues safe (default-risk-free) debt to finance investment, stock price will
not fall." Thus, management's method for raising additional capital may provide
information to the market concerning firm growth and investment prospects. We
will argue that unsecured REIT debt is a riskier form of debt for the REIT than
traditional secured debt. Therefore, a REIT's decision to issue unsecured debt
7 Myers, S.C. and N.S. Majluf, 1984, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have
Information that Investors Do Not Have," Journal of Finance, 13, 187-221.
over secured debt may be a signal to the market of a reduction in firm growth
prospects.
Issuance Cost
Issuance cost of unsecured debt relative to secured debt and equity may be a
contributory factor to unsecured debt issuance growth. Based on issuance and
transaction costs of equity, secured financing, and unsecured financing, the
ability to act on NPV projects will be impacted. The lower the issuance costs,
the more positive NPV projects can be undertaken, as less of the bottom line is
eroded by transaction and underwriting fees. The fact that REITs are moving to
unsecured debt may signal REITs' need to find cheaper debt vehicles out of
necessity, the positive NPV projects are getting smaller, or management's
expertise in maximizing shareholder wealth is increasing. There may be some of
each going on.
Why are REITs using unsecured debt over secured debt?
REIT managers maintain that unsecured financing can provide advantages over
secured financing. The usual rationale is twofold; unsecured debt has a lower
cost of capital and provides greater operational flexibility than secured debt.9
However, the use of unsecured debt introduces several unique constraints on
REIT management.
First, unsecured debt covenants are at least as limiting as secured debt
restrictions and affect overall operations on both the property and corporate
levels. Second, because unsecured debt issuance requires a credit rating, the
rating agencies are introduced as an additional level of oversight. Finally,
because maximum debt ratios are imposed, the use of unsecured debt can force
9 Fitch Research, 1994, "Rating Unsecured REIT Debt," September.
parallel equity financing when REITs borrow; as a result, REIT growth will be
severely constrained if the equity window closes. 0
Why are REIT managers willing to accept the operational and possible growth
restrictions imposed by the use of unsecured debt in exchange for a slightly
lower cost of debt capital? We anticipate that the results of our event study will
help us answer this question. One possible reason is that the decrease in REIT's
external growth opportunities have greatly reduced the real costs of these
constraints.
Factors That Affect the Pricing of Unsecured REIT Debt at Issuance
The required yield on debt is a function of the risks the lender incurs, which
include default risk, the cost of financial distress, and agency costs." These
risks are then translated into a risk premium over the treasury security of
corresponding duration. The magnitude of these risks and therefore the pricing
of any distinct unsecured debt issuance is influenced by conditions at three
interdependent levels; the macroeconomic environment, the individual firm, and
the specific debt offering.
Macro level variables that we consider include: the term structure of interest
rates, the level of long term interest rates, the growth rate of GDP, and the rate
of inflation. At the firm level, areas for evaluation include the property type,
quality and geographic location of the assets, management quality, and the
credit-worthiness of the REIT. Within the framework of ratio analysis, a
determination can be made regarding management performance and the ability
of the firm to pay its financial obligations as they mature. The ratios that we
consider include: total debt / market value of assets, market value of assets /
10 Nomura Research, 1995 "Unsecured REIT Debt: A Cautionary Note for Equity Investors and REIT Management,"
January.
" Fisher, L., 1959, "Determinants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds, "Journal of Political Economy,
67, 217-237.
book value of assets, income available for total fixed charges / fixed charges,
and the NIBITDA / market value of assets.
The final determinants of pricing are the terms of the specific unsecured debt
offering. Factors include its S&P rating, level of seniority, maturity date, stated
use of proceeds, and its restrictive bond covenants. These covenants include
maximum allowable levels of debt, minimum DSC ratio, restriction on
distributions, and a requirement for maintaining unencumbered assets. By
restricting financial ratios to certain parameters as well as imposing other
disciplines upon management, these covenants function to ensure that the REIT
will be able to perform its financial obligations.
Chapter 2: Price Reaction Studies to changes in capital
structure
There is significant evidence that changes in a firm's capital structure convey
new information to investors and affect stock prices. Research by Masulis
(1980)12 and Dann (1981)13 document positive abnormal returns when taxable
firms decrease their equity positions through stock repurchase. Negative
abnormal stock price returns were recorded by Asquity and Mullins (1986)14 in
response to a firm issuing seasoned common stock and thus lowering the debt
to equity ratio.
The REIT tax exempt status, however, provides a different environment in which
to observe the market reaction to a change in corporate capital structure. In
order to examine the market reaction to a REIT's shift to include unsecured debt
in its capital structure, an event study is conducted which examines a firm's stock
price reaction to the announcement of its unsecured debt offering. Further, in an
effort to disentangle those forces guiding the market reaction, cross sectional
regressions are used to relate the offering induced abnormal stock returns to
characteristics of the debt offering and firm financial ratios.
Event Study Design
Sample Construction
A list of 64 public unsecured REIT debt offerings for the period 1988 through
April 1996 was obtained from Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. The offerings in this
data set were checked against a list obtained from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. Ten of these offerings were excluded from abnormal return
calculations: six were from Health Care REITs and were excluded from our
12 Masulis, R.W., 1980, "The Effects of Capital Structure change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers,"
Journal of Finance, 8, 139-178.
" Dann, L.Y., 1981, "Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders,"
Journal of Finance, 9, 113-138.
14 Asquith, P. and D.W. Mullins, Jr., 1986, "Equity Issues and Offering Dilution," Journal of Financial Economics,
July.
analysis as were four issuing firms in which a non-interrupted 48 day daily return
series was not available. Although this provided 54 offerings to study, many
firms had multiple offerings on the same day thus further narrowing the data to
include 38 offering events; 23 unsecured debt IPO and 15 secondary unsecured
debt offerings (see Exhibit 2A & 2B on pages 18 and 19).
Exhibit 2A
IPO Data Set
Offer Date Issuer $ Amount Offer Price Offer Yield Coupon Maturit Spread Rating(S&P) DividendDay
9/24/93 First Union Real Estate Investments* $ 100 99.19% 9.00% 8.80% 10 352 B0
9/28/93 Kimco Realty Corp $ 100 98.74% 6.68% 6.50% 10 125 A- NONE
2/1/94 Security Captial Pacific Trust* $ 100 99.69% 6.92% 6.88% 14 120 A- 1
2/1/94 Security Captial Pacific Trust* $ 100 98.90% 7.61% 7.50% 20 A- 1
2/16/94 Western Investment Real Estate* $ 50 99.71% 7.92% 7.88% 10 200 BBB 3
3/30/94 United Dominion Realty Trust* $ 75 99.83% 7.29% 7.25% 5 108 BBB+ 5
9/29/93 Taubman Realty Group* $ 200 99.79% 7.00% 7.00% 8 120 BBB+
12/13/94 Developers Diversified Realty Corp.* $ 100 100.00% float float 1 float BBB (1)
1/11/95 Federal Realty Investment Trust $ 100 99.82% 8.92% 8.88% 5 110 BBB+ (10)
1/23/95 Wellsford Residential Property $ 100 99.40% 9.50% 9.38% 7 165 BBB- (24)
2/23/95 CP Limited Partnership/Chateau Prop. $ 75 99.82% 8.80% 8.75% 5 165 BBB- NONE
2/24/95 Security Capital Industrial $ 50 100.00% 9.34% 9.34% 20 175 BBB+ (16)
2/24/95 Security Capital Industrial $ 150 100.00% 8.72% 8.72% 14 140 BBB+ (16)
3/30/95 New Plan Realty $ 100 98.64% 7.95% 7.75% 10 78 A+ (14)
4/19/95 Assocated Estates Realty $ 75 99.58% 8.48% 8.38% 5 165 BBB-
6/20/95 Merry Land & Investment* $ 120 99.56% 7.31% 7.25% 10 118 BBB+
9/13/95 Avalon Properties $ 100 99.84% 7.41% 7.38% 7 130 BBB- (29)
9/19/95 Duke $ 50 99.58% 7.33% 7.25% 7 125 BBB (24)
9/19/95 Duke $ 100 99.15% 7.50% 7.38% 10 135 BBB (24)
10/27/95 Price REIT $ 100 99.05% 7.48% 7.25% 5 160 BBB- (29)
11/21/95 Franchise Finance Corp $ 50 99.79% 7.91% 7.88% 10 198 BBB-
11/21/95 Franchise Finance Corp 150 99.19% 7.20% 7.00% 5 150 BBB-
12/6/95 Spieker Properties $ 110 100.00% 6.95% 6.95% 7 140 BBB NONE
12/6/96 Spieker Properties $ 100 99.86% 6.68% 6.65% 5 120 BBB NONE
12/6/96 Spieker Properties $ 50 99.89% 6.82% 6.80% 6 130 BBB NONE
1/23/96 Chelsea GCA Realty $ 100 99.59% 7.85% 7.75% 5 250 BB (18)
3/21/96 IRT Property Company $ 50 99.83% 7.49% 7.45% 5 145 BBB- (23)
4/24/96 Sun Communities $ 65 99.86% 7.41% 7.38% 5 108 BBB- (28)
4/24/96 Sun Communities $ 85 99.69% 7.68% 7.63% 7 120 BBB- (28)
5/17/96 TriNet Corp. Realty Trust $ 100 99.76% 7.36% 7.30% 5 95 BBB- (36)
5/17/96 TriNet Corp. Realty Trust $ 50 99.85% 7.97% 7.95% 10 132 BBB- (36)
* indicates a dividend was declared by the issuing firm within a five day period of the unsecured debt offering.______
Exhibit 2B
Secondary Offering Data Set
Offer Date Issuer $ Amount Offer Price Offer Yield Coupon Maturity Spread Rating(S&P) Dividend Day
2/3/94 Kimco Realty Corp $ 100 99.77% float float 5 float A- (6)
2/3/94 Kimco Realty Corp $ 50 100.00% float float 4 float A- (6j)
9/20/94 United Dominion Realty Trust $ 150 99.69% 8.55% 8.50% 30 100 BBB+ NONE
6/22/94 Taubman Realty Group* $ 200 99.95% 8.01% 8.00% 5 120 BBB+ 2
10/28/94 Taubman Realty Group $ 100 99.84% float float 3 float BBB+ (22)
5/9/95 Security Capital Industrial $ 75 99.50% 7.94% 7.88% 14 135 BBB+ (6)
5/9/95 Security Capital Industrial $ 18 99.59% 7.35% 7.25% 5 135 BBB+ (6)
5/9/95 Security Capital Industrial $ 18 99.52% 7.40% 7.30% 6 135 BBB+ (6)
5/9/95 Security Capital Industrial $ 15 99.91% 7.16% 7.13% 3 135 BBB+ (6)
5/10/95 Developers Diversified Realty Corp $ 100 99.69% 7.70% 7.63% 5 145 BBB (41)
5/31/95 New Plan Realty $ 81 99.61% 6.87% 6.80% 7 70 A+ NONE
6/22/95 Taubman Realty Group* $ 100 99.68% 7.56% 7.50% 7 165 BBB+ 4
8/21/95 Wellsford Residential Property $ 70 98.79% 7.93% 7.75% 10 140 BBB 38
8/21/95 Wellsford Residential Property $ 55 98.38% 7.40% 7.25% 5 110 BBB (38)
11/3/95 Merry Land & Investment $ 40 99.30% 6.98% 7.25% 9 106 BBB+ (37)
11/3/95 Merry Land & Investment $ 40 99.90% 6.89% 7.25% 8 102 BBB+ (37)
11/10/95 Associated Estates Realty Corp $ 10 100.00% 7.10% 7.10% 7 125 BBB- (21)
12/4/95 Federal Realty Investment Trust $ 40 100.00% 0.66% 6.63% 10 101 BBB+ NONE
1/19/96 Spieker Properties $ 100 99.60% 6.97% 6.90% 8 147 BBB (7)
5/14/96 Security Capital Industrial $ 50 98.88% 7.28% 7.25% 6 90 BBB+ (7)
5/14/96 Security Capital Industrial $ 100 98.83% 7.97% 7.95% 12 132 BBB+ (71
5/14/96 Security Capital Industrial $ 50 99.71% 8.68% 8.65% 20 175 BBB+ (7)
2/20/96 Security Capital Pacific Trust $ 50 99.89% 7.17% 7.15% 14 117 A- (13
2/20/96 Security Capital Pacific Trust $ 100 99.87% 7.91% 7.90% 20 145 A- (13)
* indicates a dividend was declared by the issuing firm within a five day period of the unsecured debt offering.
Excess Return Measure
Event study methodology15 was used to determine abnormal daily stock returns
around the day of the unsecured debt offerings. The market model was used to
measure abnormal daily stock price returns for the event period (days -5 to 5).
Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between a stock's actual total
daily return (Rt) and the expected daily return, as predicted by the Capital Asset
Pricing Model. A total return series for individual firms and the S&P 500 were
calculated assuming immediate dividend reinvestment. The daily abnormal
return (ARjt) for firm j on day t is defined as the residual of the actual daily return
and the estimated daily return:
ARjt = Rjt -(aj+j* Rmt)
Rjt is defined at the actual daily stock return for firm j on day t, with aj + j as the
ordinary least squares estimate of the daily total return for firm j. Both ajand j
are estimated during the observation period (days -42 to -6). Standard
estimation period regression analysis is used during this time period in which the
stock's total daily return is the independent variable and the Standard and Poor
500 total daily return series is the dependent variable.
The average abnormal return (AARt) for each day t over all the firms in the
sample with Nt firms are defined as:
1 Nt
AARt = E ARjt
Nt 1
1Brown and Warner, 1985, "Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies," Journal of Financial, 14,
3-31.
20
Test Statistic Under the Null Hypothesis
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the mean day t excess returns equal
zero. The test statistic (TSt) used to check the statistical significance of the
event period average abnormal returns is the ratio of the day t excess returns to
the standard deviation, which is estimated from the time series of mean excess
returns. P equals the number of days in the observation period. If the average
abnormal returns are independent, identically distributed and normal, the test
statistic (TSt) is distributed Student-t under the null hypothesis.16
TSt = AARt S(AARt)
1 NtAARt= Z ARjt
Nt 1
I=2/
S(AARt)= j(AARt- A)
== 1t 'A= - AARt
Pt=-42
Potential Measurement Problems
The event day 0 represents the day in which the unsecured debt offering
occurred, not when the offering became public information. The Wall Street
Journal typically reported the event one day prior to the offering (day -1).
Information, however, was often available to the investor prior to the Wall Street
Journal announcement. Dow Jones News Retrieval Service provides
information to subscribers by reporting on the events leading up to an issuance.
On an inconsistent basis, Dow Jones reported on a REIT filing a shelf
registration to issue unsecured debt and later the rating a REIT received for its
planned unsecured debt issue, which typically occurred between days -14 and
" Ibid
-10. Due to the inconsistency in which this type of information was available to
the public, day -1 was found to be most relevant.
Event Study Results
Average abnormal return calculations were conducted on the 38 events in a
number of permutations. IPOs were broken out of the group as an IPO of
unsecured REIT debt may signal a change in corporate strategy, while
secondary offerings only confirm a continuation of this strategy (see Exhibits 2A
& 2B).
A number of firms timed the offering date on the unsecured debt to closely
coincide with quarterly dividends. Six of the first seven REIT unsecured debt
IPOs were timed to occur within 5 days of an ex-dividend day (see Exhibits 2A &
2B). For this reason, there may be a confounding effect on stock price for these
firms around the event period, both as a result of the debt issuance and as a
result of the dividend.
The trading volumes of firms on their dividend dates were examined for those
firms that issued dividends between days -42 and -6. Trading volume for some
of these firms showed marked increases just prior to and on the dividend day,
while others showed normal trading patterns. Due to the inconsistency volume
in which a REIT traded on its ex-dividend day, abnormal return calculations were
also conducted on all IPOs and secondary offerings, as well as without those
firms that timed their offering to coincide with dividends.
IPOs
A total of 23 REIT unsecured debt IPOs was included in the abnormal return
calculations. Average abnormal returns for the IPOs were consistently negative
between days -4 and 1. The most notable negative average abnormal returns
occurred on day -1, the day the event became public information in the Wall
Street Journal. Day -1 average abnormal returns had a t-statistic of -1.72, which
is statistically significant at the 10% confidence level (see Exhibit 2C on page
24).
These results provide evidence that the market views an initial shift in REIT
capital structure to include unsecured debt as an unfavorable event (see Exhibit
2C). Although each of the negative average abnormal returns on days -4 to 0, in
isolation, provides weak evidence of a negative reaction to unsecured debt
IPOs, five consecutive days of negative returns peaking the day on which the
information becomes public, however, is significantly more convincing. The
results suggest that there is a degree of leakage up until the offering date. Two
days after the offering (day 2), there is a rebound in which significantly positive
abnormal returns were observed. Days 3, 4, and 5 provide abnormal returns of
no consistency or significance.
The negative stock price reaction to unsecured debt IPOs, excluding those firms
which offered dividends around the event day, was substantially more
pronounced (see Exhibit 2D on page 25). When firms were excluded that issued
dividends between days -6 and 5 the t-statistic on day -1 was -2.67, which is
significant at the 2% confidence level.
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Exhibit 2C
Average Abnormal Return Results
Data Series Total
Number of Data Points 38
Day AARt |TSt
-5 0.499% 2.787709
-4 -0.214% -1.19687
-3 0.284% 1.58751
-2 -0.400% -2.23335
-1 -0.064% -0.35784
0 o -0.048% -0.26705
-0.124% -0.69068
0.488% 2.723921
0.052% 0.289344
0.229% 1.278097
-0.100% -0.55877
-0.442%
Data Series Total No Div(-4,0)
Number of Data Points 35
Day AARt TSt
-5 0.391% 1.822182
-4 -0.312% -1.45386
-3 0.363% 1.690541
-2 -0.424% -1.97527
-1 -0.111% -0.5155
0 0.056% 0.258827
-0.151% -0.70268
0.240% 1.115485
-0.019% -0.08647
0.180% 0.83667
-0.054% -0.25129
-0.428%
Data Series
Number of E
Day
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Sum(-4,0)
IPO
ita Points 23
AARt TSt
0.455% 1.673886
-0.003% -0.01245
-0.312% -1.14978
-0.320% -1.17976
-0.469% -1.72793
-0.019% -0.07086
-0.028% -0.10382
0.617% 2.270445
0.158% 0.580991
0.110% 0.406319
-0.057% -0.20875
-1.124%
Data Series IPO No Div (-4,0)
Number of Data Points 20
Day AARt TSIt
-5 0.286% 0.930406
-4 -0.185% -0.60168
-3 -0.190% -0.61766
-2 -0.475% -1.54296
-1 -0.488% -1.58804|F- I0 0.127% 0.411697
1
2
3
4
5
Sum(-4,0)
-0.029% -0.09373
0.282% 0.917888
-0.018% -0.05956
0.060% 0.195191
-0.048% -0.15668
-1.211%
Data Series Secondary+
Number of Data Points 15
Day AARt_TSt
-5 0.531% 1.556401
-4 -0.482% -1.41072
-3 1.100% 3.222246
-2 -0.357% -1.04543
-1 0.393% 1.150609
F 0 -0.039% -0.11461
1
2
3
4
5
Sum(-4,0)
-0.314% -0.91848
0.183% 0.534499
-0.019% -0.05535
0.339% 0.993248
-0.062% -0.18056
0.615% 1.802099
Data Series Secondary+No Div(-4,0)
Number of Data Points 15
Day AARt _ITSt_
-5 0.531% 1.556401
-4 -0.482% -1.41072
-3 1.100% 3.222246
-2 -0.357% -1.04543
-1 0.393% 1.150609
| 0 1
1
2
3
4
5
Sum(-4,O)
-0.039% -0.11461
-0.314% -0.91848
0.183% 0.534499
-0.019% -0.05535
0.339% 0.993248
-0.062% -0.18056
0.615%
1
2
3
4
5
Sum(-4,0)
1
2
3
4
5
Sum(-4,0)
Exhibit 2D
T- Statistic (IPOs)
2.5
2
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Secondary Offerings
The event study on secondary offerings, unlike the IPOs, does not provide any
conclusive evidence concerning whether the markets view secondary unsecured
debt offerings as a negative or as a positive event. Increased return volatility
during the event period, however, indicates that the market does react to and
recognize the offering as an important event (see Exhibit 2C). Average
abnormal returns are uniformly alternating positive to negative consecutively
from days -5 to day 0, thus suggesting an abnormally higher level of stock price
volatility as well as suggesting a random walk. Average abnormal returns after
day -1 are increasingly insignificant, marking a move away from higher levels of
return volatility (see Exhibit 2E on page 27).
Similar calculations with secondary offerings were performed without those firms
paying dividends around the event date, but the results provided no additional
insights other than those previously observed. The results were not significantly
different and further reduced an already small sample size.
Exhibit 2E
Average Abnormal Return (IPO and Secondary Offerings)
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Interpretation of Results
Assuming that unsecured debt is a riskier form of debt than traditional secured
financing at comparable debt levels, signaling theory would predict a negative
stock price reaction. The issuance of riskier debt signals to the market a
reduction in a firm's growth prospects. The greater the market assumption about
a REIT's growth potential, the more severe the negative impact on stock price to
the issuing firm of unsecured debt.
Consistent with Brealy and Myers17, the negative market reaction to unsecured
debt IPOs could also be a result of the moderate tax disadvantage that tax
exempt entities, such as REITs, experience by taking on debt. This particular
issue, however, can best be addressed by examining the REIT's stated use of
funds for offering proceeds. In particular, are offering proceeds used to pay
down existing debt and is that debt long or short term, or are the additional debt
proceeds used for acquisition and capital expenditure, thus increasing total debt
levels? Regression analysis will be used to identify whether the use of funds
plays a determining role in the market reaction to the debt offering.
The market reaction to an unsecured debt IPO may also be a reaction to a
change in corporate strategy or a reaction to a relatively untested debt vehicle
for REITs. A further examination of the specifics of the unsecured debt offerings
and the financial characteristics of the issuing firms provides further insight into
the market reaction to both IPO and secondary offerings. Cumulative average
abnormal returns from days -4 to 0 are regressed against the characteristics of
the offerings and the REITs in order to determine those factors that contribute to
the market reaction.
17 Brealy, R.A. and S.C. Myers, 1991, "Principles of Corporate Finance, Fourth Edition," McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 433.
Determinants of Negative Abnormal Returns: Regression Analysis
Firms which timed their debt offering with dividends between days -4 and 0 were
excluded. This included 3 offerings: First Union Real Estate Equities, Security
Capital Pacific Trust, and Taubman Realty group. First Union's cumulative
abnormal returns were negative at -1.29% and Security Capital Pacific were
positive at .82%. The exclusion of these two offerings significantly improved
regression results. Taubman was excluded for consistency but its exclusion did
not improve the R squared. Taubman had a highly negative cumulative
abnormal return at -4.35 (see Appendix 1 on page 58).
Firm Specific Characteristics
REIT Growth Options
Market value to book value ratio (MV/BV RATIO) is used as a proxy for a REIT's
market perceived growth prospects. We estimated the market value of a REIT's
assets as the undepreciated book value of assets less the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity prior to the offering. We assume the market has
priced growth potential assets into the market value of the equity, whereas it is
not included on the firm's balance sheet. The market to book value ratio is the
calculated market value of the REIT divided by the undepreciated book value of
assets.
Use of Debt Proceeds
To isolate whether a firm is shifting capital structure from long term debt to short
term debt, we use the percentage of proceeds to pay down long term secured
debt (PAY LTS). The percentage of proceeds to pay down both short and long
term debt (PAY DEBT) is also considered as it indicates whether the REIT will
be indirectly increasing its after issue debt to market value ratio.
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Financial Ratios
The ratio of total debt to market value (D/MV RATIO) of the firm's real estate
assets is considered. We believe this ratio to be indicative of the default risk
borne by the unsecured bondholders as well as indication to the degree in which
the firm is penalized for using debt without the benefit of a tax shield.
REIT Product Focus
The REIT product focus is modeled with dummy variables. REIT focus is
grouped as Office, Residential, and Retail. Similar to the debt to market value
ratio, the higher the sector debt to market capitalization ratio, the more the
market would react negatively to an unsecured debt offering. The average debt
to market capitalization ratio is highest for retail (43.9%), followed by residential
(40.3%) and lastly office (30.6%)18. The retail coefficient, and to a lesser extent,
the residential coefficient are expected to be negative relative to office based on
this rationale.
Offering Characteristics
Debt Maturity
Myers (1977) argues that the underinvestment problem is a result of a firm's
disincentive to make optimal investment decisions. Myers argues that a firm can
control this potential conflict by issuing shorter term debt and by placing
restrictive covenants in its indenture agreements.
When a firm chooses to issue short term debt over long term debt, the
underinvestment problem is mitigated, in that the price at which that short term
debt can be repurchased is fixed relative to long term debt. This allows
" Merrill Lynch & Co., 1996, "Comparative Valuation of REITs," April.
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management to capture more of the benefits of new positive NPV projects, rather
than spending money on repurchasing its increasingly valuable long term debt.
Maturity choice can also be a signal concerning firm growth prospects. Howe
and Shilling 9 hypothesize that a firm's choice of short term debt versus long
term debt provides information to the market in terms of that firm's long term
growth prospects and financial heath, consistent with signaling theory developed
by Myers and Majluf (1984)20and Flannery (1986)21. Firms with positive inside
information concerning future growth prospects will be better off using short term
debt and revisiting maturity choice at a later time. Once the market recognized
firm growth prospects, longer term debt may be available at a significantly lower
interest rate. It is at this point, when the market has fairly assessed firm growth
prospects, that longer term debt is fairly priced. As such, firms that issue short
term unsecured debt over long term unsecured debt may provide information to
the market concerning its future growth prospects.
Rating
As discussed in terms of signaling theory, debt maturity choice may provide a
signal as to the REIT's management quality (increased monitoring), long term
growth prospects (asymmetric information), and credit quality (refinance risk).
Flannery argues a firm with higher potential information asymmetries is more
likely to issue short term debt over long term debt. Diamond argues, due to the
cost of refinance risk, only high quality and low quality firms will issue short term
debt, while firms of medium quality will issue long term debt. For this reason, the
S&P credit rating of the issuing company, as well as the term of the debt are
considered as separate variables. The ratings range from BB+(1) to A+(7).
19 Howe, J.S. and J.D. Shilling. 1988, "Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings," Journal of Finance,
43, 983-993.
20 Majluf, N.S. and S.C. Myers,1984 "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have
Information that Investors Do Not Have," Journal of Finance, 13, 187-221.
2' Flannery, 1986, "Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," Journal of Finance, 41, 19-37.
Restrictive Debt Covenants
Two restrictive covenants are examined for each debt offering:
1. The maximum allowable ratio of debt to undepreciated book value total
assets (MAX DEBT). This ratio has a range of 50% to 65%.
2. The required multiple of unencumbered real estate assets to be held at any
given time by the REIT (% FREE). The range for this covenant falls between
0% to 200%.
Smith and Warner (1979) argue that riskier firms benefit from placing more
restrictive covenants in their indenture agreements. These covenants act to
reduce the agency conflict issues, both underinvestment and asset substitution,
that occur after debt is issued. More restrictive covenants are expected to have a
positive effect on average abnormal returns for lower quality firms and very little
effect on high quality firms that do not need covenants to guide optimal
investment behavior.
Offering Underwriter
J.P. Morgan and Merrill Lynch Capital Markets are both involved in a significant
number of unsecured debt offerings. Each offering was modeled with dummy
variables to indicate if either J.P Morgan and/or Merrill Lynch or any other firm
was involved in the offering. The ability of each underwriting firm to market and
time the offering is thought to be captured through this variable.
Offer Date
The use of unsecured debt by REITs is a somewhat new phenomenon. The
offer date is used to capture any effect resulting from the maturity of the market
between 1993 and 1996. It is expected that as the market becomes more familiar
with unsecured debt, the reaction may be less drastic.
Table 1 Regression Results
Dependent Variable CAR (4,0)
Independent Variable
Intercept
MV/BV RATIO
PAY DEBT
PAY LTS
D/MV RATIO
Residential (dummy)
Retail (dummy)
Issue Maturity
Rating
MAX DEBT
% FREE
J.P. Morgan (dummy)
Merrill Lynch (dummy)
Offer Date
R Square
Variable
Range
N/A
.95 to 1.94
0 to 100%
0% to 75%
6.9 to 52.2%
N/A
N/A
5 to 20 years
1 to 7
50 to 65%
0 to 200%
N/A
N/A
9/93 to 5/96
Predicted
Sign
N/A
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Neutral
Neutral
Positive
Coefficient
.103
-.133
.006
.071
-.112
-.007
-.017
-.002
.001
.185
.004
-.025
.003
-.000007
.781
T-Stat P-Value
1.47
-3.87
.53
2.71
-1.99
-.67
-1.26
-1.18
.20
1.80
.44
-2.92
.422
-.26
.165
.002
.600
.018
.069
.511
.230
.260
.846
.096
.661
.230
.511
.793
Regression Results and Conclusions
Overall, regression results were promising with an R square of 78%. The
predicted coefficient signs were based on theory and consistent with regression
results with the exception of one variable, the maximum debt to market
capitalization ratio.
Market Value to Book Value
The most significant regression variable is the market to book value ratio, which
supports the hypothesis that a REIT's shift to unsecured debt provides
information to the market concerning firm growth prospects. The higher the ratio
prior to the unsecured debt issue, the greater the market revision down of REIT
value. REITs with relatively low market perceived growth opportunities, as is
indicated by a low market to book value ratio, were least penalized by the market
for an unsecured debt offering. The ratio has a test statistic of -3.87 with a
negative coefficient of -. 133. A 10% increase in the market to book value ratio
prior to issue would result in a -1.3% contribution to a firm's cumulative abnormal
returns.
Use of Debt Proceeds
The use of debt proceeds used to pay down long term secured debt is also
significant. Every 10% of offering proceeds allocated to pay down long term
secured debt, resulted in a .70% positive cumulative abnormal return.
Unsecured debt may be available to an issuing REIT at a lower interest rate than
outstanding secured debt. Thus, by paying down secured debt, a REIT may be
able to reduce interest expense and grow FFO.
Debt to Market Value Ratio
The higher a firm's debt to market value ratio, the stronger the market's negative
reaction the unsecured debt offering, which is consistent with theory on capital
structure under taxation. For firms with higher debt levels, particularly firms that
are increasing their debt to market value ratio by not paying down secured debt
with offering proceeds, an unsecured debt offering is viewed as a more severe
negative event. A 10% higher debt to market value ratio prior to issuance would
result in a -.10% cumulative abnormal return for the issuing REIT.
Covenant: Maximum allowable Debt to Market Capitalization Ratio
The maximum allowable debt to market capitalization ratio was the most
significant debt offering characteristic. The coefficient was positive rather than
the expected negative with a t-statistic of 1.80. It is possible that the limitation
on debt levels is considered restricting in terms of operating flexibility.
A more plausible explanation, according to Smith and Warner, is that lower
quality firms benefit most from restrictive covenants. As such, lower quality firms
may be forced to accept a lower allowable debt to market value ratio (50%) while
higher quality firms do not gain from imposing this restriction and opt for a higher
ratio (65%).
Debt Maturity
Debt maturity, consistent with the results of Howe and Shilling and the signaling
theory presented by Masulis, Dann, Vermaelen, and Diamond, had a negative
coefficient of -.002 with a T-statistic of -1.18. These findings suggest that higher
quality firms with greater information asymmetries do choose shorter term debt
over longer term debt. Diamond also suggests the lowest quality firms also,
reluctantly, use shorter term maturity, while middle quality firms choose longer
term debt. This may explain the relatively low T-statistic of this variable.
Offering Underwriter
Also of interest are the coefficient results concerning issue underwriters. When
J.P. Morgan was involved in the underwriting, the cumulative abnormal returns
were found to be substantially negative relative to other underwriters with the
exception of Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch was found to be a positive contributor
to a firm's cumulative abnormal returns.
Chapter Summary
The event study documents the market's negative reaction to unsecured debt
IPOs through the observation of average abnormal returns prior to and leading
up to the event day 0. Negative average abnormal returns are observed
between days -4 to 0 with the most significant negative reaction occurring on day
-1, the day in which the offering became public information through the Wall
Street Journal.
The fact that the average abnormal returns are consistently negative for a five
day period leading up to the event more convincingly documents the market's
negative reaction to REIT unsecured debt IPOs than does the degree negative
average abnormal returns are observed on any single day during this same
period. When average abnormal returns were calculated excluding those firms
which timed their unsecured debt offering to coincide with their ex-dividend day,
the market's negative reaction to unsecured debt offerings appeared more
severe. This indicates that coinciding the timing of both events may have been
done deliberately by REIT management to obscure the resulting signals that the
shift in corporate strategy would provide investors.
Regression analysis, in conjunction with event study results, supports the theory
that a REIT's IPO of unsecured debt provides a signal to the market concerning
its future growth prospects. Regression results indicate the market value to book
value ratio (MV/BV RATIO), which is used as a proxy for a firm's growth
prospects, is the most significant factor in predicting the market reaction to
unsecured debt. The greater the ratio prior to the unsecured debt issue, the
more severe the market revision down of REIT value. The debt to market value
ratio (D/MV RATIO) was also significant and provide support for our taxation
argument. We were not, however, fully able to determine to what extent the
market reaction to unsecured debt IPOs is explained by signaling theory or as a
consequence of higher debt levels placed on the balance sheet of tax exempt
firms.
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the Factors Affecting the Pricing of
Unsecured REIT Debt at Issuance.
Overview
The pricing of a particular issue of unsecured debt is primarily dependent on
three elements: (1) the required rate of return on riskless debt with comparable
maturity and cash flow characteristics; (2) the probability that the firm will
experience financial distress and not be able to meet its financial obligations;
and (3) the various provisions and restrictions contained in the indenture that
deal with the agency conflicts between the shareholders and the bondholders.
The first element is determined by a set of exogenous variables and is beyond
the theoretical scope of this paper; however, the macroeconomic environment is
considered through the rate of inflation and the term structure of interest rates.
The second element is examined in terms of financial statement analysis,
including the ratios of total debt / market value and market value / book value.
The third element is investigated in the context of the debt's characteristics, with
particular emphasis on restrictive bond covenants.
Conflicts between bondholders and shareholders
With the use of risky debt, REIT management has incentives to maximize
shareholder value by configuring the firm's operating procedures and financial
characteristics in ways that might be detrimental to bondholders. Because
investment and financing decisions are endogenous, three primary sources of
conflict exist between bondholders and shareholders2:
22 Smith, C. W. Jr., and J. B. Warner, 1979, "On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of
Financial Economics 7, 117-161.
Claim dilution If a firm sells bonds that are priced assuming a maximum debt to
asset ratio, the bondholder's position is eroded by the issuance of additional
debt of equal or higher priority.
Asset substitution If bonds are issued for the stated purpose of acquiring assets
of a certain risk level, the value of the bondholders' position can be reduced if
management uses the proceeds to invest in assets that are riskier.
Underinvestment As previously mentioned, a substantial portion of the value of
the firm may be composed of intangible assets in the form of future investment
opportunities. A firm with outstanding bonds may have incentive to reject
projects which have a positive net present value if the benefit from accepting the
project accrues, in too great a proportion, to the bondholders.
The flexibility issue
A paramount issue to consider when evaluating the merits of secured debt
versus unsecured debt is the trade-off between bondholder risk (which affects
pricing ) and flexibility. The inclusion of a security provision in a debt contract
functions to mitigate some of the inherent conflicts between stockholders and
bondholders that arise with the use of risky debt. On the other hand, REIT
managers claim that unsecured debt allows them the flexibility to react relatively
quickly to a changing business environment.
Unsecured debt covenants that prudently stipulate the firm's investment
decisions could effectively prevent asset substitution; however, such covenants
would be expensive to monitor. The use of secured debt limits asset substitution
23 Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and capital
structure," Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360
24 Myers, S. C., 1977, "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial
economics 5, 147-175.
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in a way that is not as expensive to monitor as alternative forms of unsecured
25debt covenants which achieve the same end. In addition, because secured
debt encumbers specific collateral, these debtholders would not benefit from
new investments, thus limiting the underinvestment conflict. From a flexibility
standpoint, one must also consider that the use of secured debt gives
management an individual put option on each asset. In the event that a debt
maturity approaches and the capital markets will not provide a refinancing, the
use of secured debt provides the flexibility to default on an individual asset
without encumbering the rest of the portfolio.
Unsecured debt may facilitate management efficiency by allowing management
to more easily alter the composition of the REIT's portfolio; however, the use of
unsecured debt also introduces several unique constraints on REIT
management. First, unsecured debt covenants are at least as limiting as secured
debt restrictions, and affect overall operations on both the property and
corporate levels. Second, because unsecured debt issuance requires a credit
rating, the rating agencies are introduced as an additional level of oversight.
Finally, because maximum debt ratios are imposed, the use of unsecured debt
can force parallel equity financing when REITs borrow; as a result, REIT growth
will be severely constrained if the equity window closes.26 Moreover, many
unsecured offerings include a covenant requiring the REIT to retain
unencumbered assets, the value of which is a multiple of the value of the
unsecured debt offering. Only REITs with these unencumbered assets will have
the flexibility to repay maturing unsecured notes with secured debt, if necessary.
Because unsecured covenants are as least as limiting as secured debt
covenants, and the unsecured debtholders effectively have a senior position on
the unencumbered assets, one wonders if unsecured debt might not be more
25 Stulz, R.M., and H. Johnson, 1985, "An analysis of secured debt," Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 501-521.
2 6 Nomura Research, 1995, "Rating Unsecured REIT Debt: A Cautionary Note for Equity Investors and REIT
Management," January.
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restrictive at the corporate level. Secured debt does not have any covenants or
operating restrictions at the company level; however, unsecured financing
restricts the REIT at the property as well as the company level. In addition,
unsecured financing increases equity risk by imposing exogenously driven
limitations upon a REIT management's flexibility to optimize leverage.
Restrictive debt covenants
Since the ground breaking work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1962), capital
structure theorists have discussed the impact of indenture provisions on the
allocation of risk between bondholders and stockholders. There appears to be
general agreement in the literature that prices in the corporate debt market are
affected by the debtholder's expectations about the stockholder's behavior after
the bonds are issued, and that restrictive covenants can help ensure that the
value of the bondholders position is not eroded through management's behavior.
Without these covenants, bondholders would require a higher yield. This
prompts the question as to which covenants are more valuable to the
bondholders and as a result, have a greater impact on required yields.
The Methodology
To analyze the factors that affect the pricing of fixed rate unsecured REIT debt
at issuance, a multivariate regression analysis is performed. The fixed yield
spread above U.S. Treasury securities of comparable maturity is regressed
against three categories of variables: macroeconomic data, financial ratio's of
the REITs, and characteristics of the debt offerings.
27 ibid.
The Data
A list of public unsecured REIT debt offerings for the period February 1988
through April 1996 was obtained from Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. The offerings
noted in this data-set were checked against a list obtained from Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
A total of sixty four unsecured debt offerings was obtained from these sources.
Since we are studying the pricing determinants of a relatively new REIT
financing strategy, we include only the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of REIT
unsecured debt. Thirty seven of these offerings were IPOs of unsecured debt.
Three IPOs were from Health Care REITs , and due to the controversy regarding
their real estate classification, they were excluded from the data-set. Two IPOs
had a floating interest rate, and because the dependent variable in our analysis
is the fixed spread above Treasury securities, they were also excluded from the
data-set. A summary of the remaining thirty two offerings (see Exhibit 3A on
page 43).
Exhibit 3A
IPO Offerings
(000)'s
Number Offer Date Issuer Ticker Amount Offer Price Offer Yield Coupon Maturity Spread Rating(S&P)
1 9/24/93 First Union Real Estate Investments FUR $100.00 99.19% 9.00% 8.80% 10 352 BBB-
2 9/28/93 Kimco Realty Corp KIM $100.00 98.74% 6.68% 6.50% 10 125 A-
3 2/1/94 Security Captial Pacific Trust PTR $100.00 99.69% 6.92% 6.88% 14 120 A-
4 2/1/94 Security Captial Pacific Trust PTR $100.00 98.90% 7.61% 7.50% 20 120 A-
5 2/16/94 Western Investment Real Estate WIR $ 50.00 99.71% 7.92% 7.88% 10 200 BBB
6 3/30/94 United Dominion Realty Trust UDR $ 75.00 99.83% 7.29% 7.25% 5 108 BBB+
7 6/22/94 Taubman Realty Group TCO $200.00 99.95% 8.01% 8.00% 5 120 BBB+
8 1/11/95 Federal Realty Investment Trust FRT $100.00 99.82% 8.92% 8.88% 5 110 BBB+
9 1/23/95 Wellsford Residential Property WRP $100.00 99.40% 9.50% 9.38% 7 165 BBB-
10 2/23/95 CP L.P. - Chateau Properties CPJ $ 75.00 99.82% 8.80% 8.75% 5 165 BBB-
11 2/24/95 Security Capital Industrial SCN $ 50.00 100.00% 9.34% 9.34% 20 175 BBB+
12 2/24/95 Security Capital Industrial SCN $150.00 100.00% 8.72% 8.72% 14 140 BBB+
13 3/30/95 New Plan Realty NPR $100.00 98.64% 7.95% 7.75% 10 78 A+
14 4/19/95 Assocated Estates Realty AEC $ 75.00 99.58% 8.48% 8.38% 5 165 BBB-
15 6/20/95 Merry Land & Investment MRY $120.00 99.56% 7.31% 7.25% 10 118 BBB+
16 9/13/95 Avalon Properties UDR $100.00 99.84% 7.41% 7.38% 7 130 BBB-
17 9/19/95 Duke DRE $ 50.00 99.58% 7.33% 7.25% 7 125 BBB
18 9/19/95 Duke DRE $100.00 99.15% 7.50% 7.38% 10 135 BBB
19 10/27/95 Price REIT RET $100.00 99.05% 7.48% 7.25% 5 160 BBB-
20 11/21/95 Franchise Finance Corp FFA $ 50.00 99.79% 7.91% 7.88% 10 198 BBB-
21 11/21/95 Franchise Finance Corp FFA $150.00 99.19% 7.20% 7.00% 5 150 BBB-
22 12/6/95 Spieker Properties SPK $110.00 100.00% 6.95% 6.95% 7 140 BBB
23 12/6/96 Spieker Properties SPK $100.00 99.86% 6.68% 6.65% 5 120 BBB
24 12/6/96 Spieker Properties SPK $ 50.00 99.89% 6.82% 6.80% 6 130 BBB
25 1/23/96 Chelsea GCA Realty CCG $100.00 99.59% 7.85% 7.75% 5 250 BB+
26 2/15/96 Camden Propery Trust CPT $100.00 99.56% 6.73% 6.63% 5 150 BBB-
27 3/7/96 Tanger Properties L..P. SKT $ 75.00 99.30% 8.93% 8.75% 5 325 BB+
28 3/21/96 IRT Property Company IRT $ 50.00 99.83% 7.49% 7.45% 5 145 BBB-
29 4/24/96 Sun Communities SUN $ 65.00 99.86% 7.41% 7.38% 5 108 BBB-
30 4/24/96 Sun Communities SUN $ 85.00 99.69% 7.68% 7.63% 7 120 BBB-
31 5/17/96 TriNet Corp. Realty Trust TRI $100.00 99.76% 7.36% 7.30% 5 95 BBB-
32 5/17/96 TriNet Corp. Realty Trust TRI $ 50.00 99.85% 7.97% 7.95% 10 132 BBB-
Information necessary to construct the variables was gathered from the following
sources:
* U.S. Treasury interest rates, U.S. Government Index data, and stock prices
were obtained from the Bloomberg Information Service.
" Data necessary to compute financial ratios was obtained from 10-K and 1 0-Q
filings, and annual reports. When an offering date was not during a REIT's
first fiscal quarter, annualized data was reconstructed from the above
sources.
" Specific offering characteristics were obtained from the offering Prospectus
and Prospectus Supplement.
Variables used in the regression
The following is an explanation of the dependent and explanatory variables used
in the regression, and their expected coefficient signs: (see Exhibit 3B on page
49).
BPs OVER The dependent variable is calculated by subtracting the yield on the
U.S. Treasury Security of comparable maturity from the yield on the unsecured
debt at issuance. The difference, reported in basis points (BP's), is a measure of
the market's perception of the risk inherent in the debt issue. This variable has a
value range of 78 BP's - 352 BP's.
A CPI (+) The effect of inflation is captured by the annualized percentage
change in the CPI (All Items Price index). The range of values for this variable
is 2.69% - 4.54%. In an inflationary economic environment, the real rate of return
on fixed rate debt is eroded over time. As the inflation rate increases, the capital
market should require an interest rate premium to compensate for this loss. A
higher inflation rate should require a higher premium.
20YR - 3MO (-) The term structure of interest rates, graphically depicted as the
Yield Curve, reflects the capital market's expectations about the level of interest
rates in the future. If the Yield Curve is relatively flat or inverted, borrowers will
prefer to lock-in their cost of capital with long term debt; however, lenders will
prefer to lend short-term. The opposite is true when the Yield Curve is upward
sloping. To entice borrowers to issue long term debt in a rising Yield Curve
environment, lenders must afford borrowers a pricing discount relative to the
cost of short term debt. As the slope of the Yield curve increases so should the
discount. This variable has a range of .38% - 3.38% and is defined as the
difference between interest rates for the 20 year Treasury Bond and the 3 month
Treasury Bill at the time of the unsecured debt issuance.
PAY DEBT (-) This variable is defined as the percentage of the debt issuance
proceeds that is used to repay all categories of debt as opposed to being used
for operations, and ranges in value from 0% - 100%. New debt that is not used
to repay existing debt will increase the percentage of total debt in the REITs
capital structure. This will result in a decrease in debt coverage and a
corresponding increase in the amount of investment risk that is borne by the
bondholder. As a result, one would expect that the value of this variable and the
required risk premium should have an inverse relationship.
PAY LTS (-) The range of values for this variable is 0% - 75%, and represents
the percentage of the debt issuance proceeds that is used to repay long-term
secured debt (mortgages). Because unsecured debt holds a lien position that is
junior to secured debt, replacing long-term secured debt with long-term
unsecured debt effectively enhances the lien position of the unsecured bond
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holders. Consequently, as the value of this variable increases, the unsecured
bondholders should require less of a risk premium.
MATURITY (+) The time to maturity of the individual debt issues varies from
5 years - 20 years. A firm's choice of maturity structure for its corporate debt,
can provide information to the market concerning the growth prospects and
overall financial health of the firm28. Because short term borrowing subjects a
firm to greater refinancing risk than long term borrowing, when risky debt of both
long and short maturity is available, high quality firms will issue more short term
debt and low quality firms will issue more long term debt29. Rational investors
understand this incentive, and one would expect them to demand an increasing
risk premium as the maturity of the debt lengthens.
S & P (-) The Standard and Poor's bond ratings for the data-set range from A+
to BB+. These ratings are transformed into a numerical scale with A+ equal to 7
and declining 1 per rating grade thereafter. The relative quality of a firm's
financial and business prospects can be judged from the ratings given by
Standard and Poor's. Since bond ratings reflect the probability of default, one
would expect a close correspondence between a bond's rating and its yield. On
our scale, a higher rating should require a lower risk premium.
MAX DEBT (+) A common debt covenant is one that restricts the maximum
allowable ratio of total debt to undepreciated book value of total assets. This
variable represents that restriction and has a value range of 50% - 65%. By
requiring a minimum equity investment in the firm, this ratio effectively acts to
limit the default risk borne by the bondholders. As the value of this variable
increases, so should the required risk premium.
2 HoWe, J. S., and J. D. Shilling, 1988, "Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings," Journal of Finance,
43, 983-993.
29 Flannery, M. J., 1986, "Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice," Journal of Finance, 41, 19-37.
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MAX MORT (-) A dummy variable representing a negative debt covenant that
stipulates the maximum permitted ratio of secured debt to undepreciated book
value of total assets. 1 = covenant is present; 0 = covenant is not present. The
logic for the variable is similar to that used to explain the expected sign for PAY
LTS. Because unsecured debt holds a lien position that is junior to secured debt,
limiting the amount of secured debt effectively enhances the lien position of the
unsecured bond holders. Consequently, if this covenant exists, the unsecured
bondholders should require a lower risk premium.
% FREE (-) This variable represents a positive covenant that specifies the
minimum multiple of the outstanding principle amount of total unsecured debt
that must be maintained in unencumbered real estate assets. The results of this
covenant are: (1) to effectively give the unsecured bondholders a first lien
position on those assets, and (2) to assure a source of collateral that can be
mortgaged to repay the unsecured bondholders at maturity if the unsecured debt
window is closed. The range of values for this variable is 0% - 200%, and one
would expect that as this variable increases, the required risk premium would
decrease.
D/MV RATIO(+) This variable represents the annualized ratio of total debt to
the market value of assets at the time of the debt issuance, and has a value
range of 6.91% - 52.19%.30 Similar to the logic supporting the use of the MAX
DEBT variable, one would expect that the default risk borne by the unsecured
bondholders would have a direct relationship to the relative value of this
variable.
3 We estimate the market value of the firm's assets as the undepreciated value of total assets plus the current
market value of equity minus the book value of equity.
MV/BV RATIO (+) The ratio (just prior to debt issuance) of market value of
assets to the undepreciated book value of assets has a value range of 0.95 -
1.94, and is used as a proxy for the market's perception of the REIT's growth
opportunities. Since a REIT's balance sheet does not include intangible assets
like growth options, the more growth options the market perceives, the higher
the value of this ratio.31 Relying on potential growth opportunities as collateral
for an unsecured loan is riskier then lending on assets in place, therefore, one
would assume that lenders would require a higher risk premium from firms with
higher ratio values.
31 Barclay, M. J., and C. W. Smith, Jr., 1995, "The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities," The Journal of
Finance, L, 3.
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Exhibit 3B
Regression Variables
Offer Date Issuer BP's OVER CPI 20YR-3MO PAY DEBT PAY LTS MATURITY S&P MAX DEBT MAX MORT % FREE DIMV RATIO MV/BV RATIO
1 9/24/93 First Union Real Estate Investments 352 2.62% 2.73% 50% 10% 10 2 50% 0 0% 39.66% 1.21
2 9/28/93 Kimco Realty Corp 125 2.62% 2.64% 0% 0% 10 5 65% 1 0% 21.71% 1.75
3 2/1/94 Security Captial Pacific Trust 120 2.52% 2.92% 50% 0% 14 5 60% 1 0% 8.10% 1.36
4 2/1/94 Security Captial Pacific Trust 120 2.52% 2.92% 50% 0% 20 5 60% 1 0% 8.10% 1.36
5 2/16/94 Western Investment Real Estate 200 2.52% 2.83% 40% 0% 10 3 55% 0 0% 27.21% 1.04
6 3/30/94 United Dominion Realty Trust 108 2.15% 3.38% 80% 0% 5 4 60% 1 0% 21.00% 1.83
7 6/22/94 Taubman Realty Group 120 2.22% 2.98% 100% 75% 5 4 60% 1 0% 52.19% 1.94
8 1/11/95 Federal Realty Investment Trust 110 2.39% 2.07% 80% 25% 5 4 65% 1 0% 30.82% 1.33
9 1/23/95 Wellsford Residential Property 165 2.39% 1.96% 100% 0% 7 2 60% 1 150% 48.75% 0.95
10 2/23/95 CP L.P. - Chateau Properties 165 2.59% 1.82% 100% 25% 5 2 50% 1 150% 37.20% 1.30
11 2/24/95 Security Capital Industrial 175 2.59% 1.57% 100% 0% 20 4 60% 1 150% 20.00% 1.26
12 2/24/95 Security Capital Industrial 140 2.59% 1.57% 100% 0% 14 4 60% 1 150% 20.00% 1.26
13 3/30/95 New Plan Realty 78 2.65% 1.44% 60% 10% 10 7 65% 1 100% 6.91% 1.75
14 4/19/95 Assocated Estates Realty 165 2.65% 1.44% 100% 0% 5 2 65% 1 150% 20.83% 1.55
15 6/20/95 Merry Land & Investment 118 2.84% 0.73% 0% 0% 10 4 60% 1 150% 12.16% 1.29
16 9/13/95 Avalon Properties 130 2.41% 0.90% 100% 0% 7 2 60% 1 150% 25.61% 1.27
17 9/19/95 Duke 125 2.41% 0.96% 50% 0% 7 3 55% 1 185% 26.12% 1.23
18 9/19/95 Duke 135 2.41% 0.96% 50% 0% 10 3 55% 1 185% 26.12% 1.23
19 10/27/95 Price REIT 160 2.41% 0.80% 90% 0% 5 2 50% 1 200% 25.35% 1.07
20 11/21/95 Franchise Finance Corp 198 2.60% 0.60% 100% 0% 10 2 60% 1 150% 18.70% 1.37
21 11/21/95 Franchise Finance Corp 150 2.60% 0.60% 100% 0% 5 2 60% 1 150% 18.70% 1.37
22 12/6/95 Spieker Properties 140 2.40% 0.38% 100% 50% 7 3 60% 1 165% 33.39% 1.35
23 12/6/95 Spieker Properties 120 2.40% 0.38% 100% 50% 5 3 60% 1 165% 33.39% 1.35
24 12/6/95 Spieker Properties 130 2.40% 0.38% 100% 50% 6 3 60% 1 165% 33.39% 1.35
25 1/23/96 Chelsea GCA Realty 250 2.26% 1.04% 100% 0% 5 1 60% 1 0% 17.47% 1.35
26 2/15/96 Camden Property Trust 150 2.45% 1.35% 100% 0% 5 2 60% 1 150% 39.69% 1.14
27 3/7/96 Tanger Properties L.P. 325 2.45% 1.57% 100% 0% 5 1 60% 1 0% 40.07% 1.13
28 3/21/96 IRT Property Company 145 2.45% 1.74% 100% 0% 5 2 60% 1 150% 42.23% 1.09
29 4/24/96 Sun Communities 108 2.44% 1.90% 30% 20% 5 2 55% 1 150% 26.46% 1.25
30 4/24/96 Sun Communities 120 2.44% 1.90% 30% 20% 7 2 55% 1 150% 26.46% 1.25
31 5/17/96 TriNet Corp. Realty Trust 95 2.56% 1.87% 100% 20% 5 2 55% 1 185% 39.63% 1.18
32 5/17/96 TriNet Corp. Realty Trust 132 2.56% 1.87% 100% 20% 10 2 55% 1 185% 39.63% 1.18
MEAN 152 2.48% 1.63% 77% 12% 8 (BBB) 3 59% 0.94 109% 27.72% 1.32
MIN 78 2.15% 0.38% 0% 0% 5 1 50% 0 0% 6.91% 0.95
MAX 352 2.84% 3.38% 100% 75% 20 7 65% 1 200% 52.19% 1.94
EXPECTED SIGN (+) (- (- (-) ( (-) (+) (-) (-) (+)(
REGRESSION SIGN (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (+)
Variables not used in the regression
Data were collected for several variables that were ultimately not used in the
final regression. These variables fell into two broad categories: Standard and
Statistically Insignificant.
STANDARD This category includes both characteristics and covenants of the
debt issues that did not vary within the data-set and includes the following:
" All of the REITs were self-administered and managed
" All of the issues paid a semi-annual dividend
* All of the issues were senior unsecured debt
* All of the issues had full call protection
" None of the issues had a sinking fund
" All of the issues had restrictions on merger, consolidation and sale
" All of the issues had requirements for: maintenance of properties
insurance coverage
payment of taxes
furnishing financial information
Statistically insignificant This category includes variables that had very low
t-Statistics and when included in the regression, negatively impacted both the
value of R Square and the total number of independent variables with
statistically significant t-Stats at the 5% level of confidence. The following is a
brief description of each variable:
Time Index - a continuous time variable segmented into months
A GDP - % change in GDP over the 12 months preceding the offer date
Yield 20 yr. - the yield on the 20 year Treasury bond as of the offer date
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Min DSC - the minimum permitted ratio of consolidated income available
for debt service to total annual debt service
Div Limit - a dummy variable representing a covenant that restricts
distributions that would cause a default of any indebtedness
Type - a dummy variable designed to isolate the dominant property
type in the REIT's portfolio
Focus - a dummy variable designed to isolate REITs that are both
property type and geographically specific ( sharpshooters )
Fixed cover - the ratio of income available for total fixed charges to total
fixed charges
NIBITDA / Market - ratio of net income before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization to market value of total assets ( profitability ratio)
It would have made sense to include a variable representing the percentage of
insider ownership in each REIT. Unfortunately, due to time constraints and the
difficulty of obtaining the information, we were unable to include it.
Results and conclusions
The results of the regression are shown on Exhibit 3C on page 54. In general,
the model does a good job of explaining the determinants of unsecured REIT
debt pricing. The R Square was 90%, and with one exception, PAY DEBT, the
independent variables had statistically significant t-stats at high confidence
levels.
Overall, these results indicate that the market has a strong reaction to each
distinct variable. Applied individually, many of the coefficients would have a
substantial impact on the dependent variable. With a t-stat of -6.75, the most
statistically significant variable is % FREE. This result is meaningful for two
principal reasons. First, as previously stated, this covenant effectively gives the
unsecured bondholders a first lien position on a stated dollar value of
unencumbered assets. As a result, this covenant acts to upgrade the unsecured
debt to a less subordinate position. Second, over time, this covenant has
evolved from a completely non-existent status into an almost standard provision
in unsecured REIT debt contracts (see Exhibit 3B). Once the covenant came
into existence, only two offerings in our data-set (Chelsea GCA Realty and
Tanger Properties L.P.) did not include it, and both paid a severe BP penalty for
this omission. It appears that assuring management's flexibility to repay maturing
unsecured notes is of paramount importance to unsecured bondholders.
Two of the variables, PAY DEBT and MAX DEBT, produced coefficients with
unexpected signs. These results are contrary to Brealey and Myers assertions
that tax exempt firms experience a moderate disadvantage from the use of debt.
We offer the following rationale in an attempt to elucidate these unanticipated
results:
PAY DEBT (+) As the value of PAY DEBT decreases, total firm debt increases;
however, all the unsecured debt offerings in our data-set contain a covenant
(MAX DEBT) that limits the maximum debt level that the REIT may incur. In
addition, because access to the unsecured debt market is restricted to REITs
with good quality management, bondholders should have confidence in
management's ability to make positive NPV investments. Because positive NPV
investments increase the bondholders coverage, one would expect that the
value of this variable and the required risk premium would have a direct
relationship.
MAX DEBT (-) Perhaps the explanation for this variable's sign can be found in
signaling theory. According to Smith and Warner, lower quality firms benefit
most from restrictive bond covenants; as a result, lower quality firms may be
relegated to a lower allowable debt level while higher quality firms may opt for a
higher allowable debt level. REIT management may be sending a signal about
firm quality through the value of the MAX DEBT variable. It appears that the
bondholders are reacting to perceived firm quality and rewarding the higher
quality firms while simultaneously penalizing the lower quality firms.
It is interesting to note that the three variables that are classified as negative
debt covenants, MAX DEBT, MAX MORT, AND % FREE, all have negative
coefficients. As a group, they have a greater impact on the dependent variable
than any other category of variables used in the regression. It appears that these
covenants do effectively act to temper the inherent conflicts between the holders
of debt and equity, and that the market is cognizant of this fact. By far, the
variable with the greatest potential impact on the dependent variable is MAX
DEBT (t-stat -2.64). Within this variable's value range, its coefficient of -455.07
would decrease the required yield by 225 BP - 295 BP.
Exibit 3C
Regression Results
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.95
R Square 0.90
Adjusted R Square 0.84
Standard Error 23.86
Observations 32.00
ANOVA
df 5~ Ms F Significance F
Regression 11.00 97,757.28 8,887.03 15.61 0.00
Residual 20.00 11,389.59 569.48
Total 31.00 109,146.88
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 247.23 128.22 1.93 0.07 -20.22 514.69 -20.22 514.69
CPI 8,833.93 4,263.67 2.07 0.05 -59.94 17,727.79 -59.94 17,727.79
20YR-3MO -5,313.59 1,009.63 -5.26 0.00 -7,419.65 -3,207.54 -7,419.65 -3,207.54
PAY DEBT 24.05 18.68 1.29 0.21 -14.90 63.01 -14.90 63.01
PAY LTS -123.01 36.77 -3.35 0.00 -199.71 -46.32 -199.71 -46.32
MATURITY 5.54 1.70 3.26 0.00 1.99 9.08 1.99 9.08
S&P -21.35 6.44 -3.32 0.00 -34.79 -7.92 -34.79 -7.92
MAX DEBT -455.07 172.32 -2.64 0.02 -814.52 -95.62 -814.52 -95.62
MAX MORT -49.22 25.90 -1.90 0.07 -103.24 4.80 -103.24 4.80
% FREE -76.18 11.29 -6.75 0.00 -99.73 -52.64 -99.73 -52.64
D/MV RATIO 271.72 76.05 3.57 0.00 113.09 430.36 113.09 430.36
MVIBV RATIO 80.56 34.44 2.341 0.03 8.72 152.39 8.72 152.39
Chapter 4: Conclusion
This thesis has explored several theoretical issues concerning the forces
motivating REITs to access the unsecured debt market versus the equity and
traditional mortgage markets for capital, and those factors affecting the pricing of
this debt. Within this context, three analyses were performed. The first was an
event study which documented market reaction to unsecured debt issuance, as
observed through stock price change. In the second, the abnormal returns
obtained in the first analysis were regressed against firm financial attributes and
the debt offering characteristics. Finally, in an attempt to expose the
determinants of debt pricing, the fixed yield spreads above U.S. Treasury
securities of comparable maturity were regressed against macroeconomic
variables, financial ratios of the REITs, and characteristics of the debt offerings.
The event study documents the negative market reaction to unsecured debt
IPOs through the observation of average abnormal returns prior to and leading
up to the event day 0. Negative average abnormal returns are observed
between days -4 to 0 with the most significant negative reaction occurring on day
-1, the day in which the offering became public information through the Wall
Street Journal.
The fact that the average abnormal returns are consistently negative for a five
day period leading up to the event more convincingly document the market's
negative reaction to REIT unsecured debt IPOs than does the degree negative
average abnormal returns are observed on any single day during the event
period.
Early in the IPO proliferation, most firms timed their unsecured debt IPOs to
coincide with dividends. When average abnormal returns were calculated
excluding those firms, the market's negative reaction to unsecured debt offerings
appeared more severe. This indicates that coinciding the timing of both events
may have been done deliberately by REIT management to obscure the resulting
signals that the shift in corporate strategy would provide investors.
Regression analysis, in conjunction with event study results, supports the theory
that a REIT's IPO of unsecured debt provides a signal to the market concerning
its future growth prospects. Regression results indicate the market value to book
value ratio (Tobin's Q), which is used as a proxy for a firm's growth prospects, is
the most significant factor in predicting the market reaction to unsecured debt.
The greater the ratio prior to the unsecured debt issue, the more severe the
market revision down of REIT value.
Regression results of other variables, including the debt to market value ratio,
also supported the notion that REITs do incur a slight disadvantage by taking on
debt. REITs, due to their tax exempt status are not able to use the tax shield
generated by debt, but do incur the agency conflicts that result from higher debt
levels. Our results did not fully allow us to determine the extent to which the
market reaction to unsecured debt IPOs is explained by signaling theory or as a
consequence of the disadvantage higher debt levels place on tax exempt firms.
The results of the pricing determinant regression were notable in three respects.
First, the model was able to explain, at high levels of statistical significance,
approximately 90% of the value of the dependent variable. Second, of the three
variable categories used, characteristics of the debt offerings had the greatest
impact on the dependent variable; and within that category, negative covenants
were the most consequential. This suggests that, although they are costly to
include and monitor, restrictive covenants help protect the value of the
bondholders' position, and that borrowers are rewarded with a lower interest rate
for utilizing these covenants. Finally, and perhaps most important, the variable
with the highest level of statistical significance is the negative covenant, %
FREE. This result implies that bondholders believe that the use of this covenant
increases management's flexibility to repay unsecured debt at maturity. This
tends to decrease the legitimacy of management's claim of increased flexibility
as a justification for using unsecured debt, and adds validity to the argument that
the use unsecured debt is a signal of decreased growth opportunities.
In conclusion, the results from the three topical areas of our analysis appear to
lend support to the following assertions:
" The market reacts negatively to a REIT unsecured debt IPO.
* The use of unsecured debt by a REIT signals a reduction in future growth
opportunities.
. Unsecured debt provides less operational flexibility than secured debt.
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Appendix 1
Abnormal Retums (IPOs)
FUR KIM PTR WIR UDR TCO
1.007% 0.645% 0.619% -1.026% 0.176% 2.975%
-0.848% -1.397% -0.143% 0.828% -0.271% 4.017%
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Abnormal Return (5)
I Cumulative Abnormal Return (-4.0)
PK CCG IRT SUI TRI
-1.594% 1.476% -0.031% 3.152% -0.425%
-0.313% -2.258% 0.078% -0.988% 0.768%
0.435% 1.047% -0.585% 0.512% 1.080%
-0.270% -0.431% 0.172% -0.509% -0.890%
0.070% -0.288% 0.219% 0.474% -0.427%
1.515% 0.311% 0.160% 1.055% -1.165%
2.602% 0.211% 1.426% -0.995% -0.267%
-0.095% 0.023% -1.232% 0.026% -0.440%
-0.051% 0.388% -0.066% -0.473% -1.712%
0.269% -0.366% 0.351% 1.036% 0.590%
0.015% -1.464% 0.112% -0.467% -0.617%
1.438% -1.618% 0.044% 0.544% -0.633%1
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Appendix 2
Abnormal Returns (Secondary Offerings)
Ticker
Abnormal Return (-5)
Abnormal Return (-4)
Abnormal Return (-3)
Abnormal Return (-2)
Abnormal Return (-1)
Abnormal Return (0)
Abnormal Return (1)
Abnormal Return (2)
Abnormal Return (3)
Abnormal Return (4)
Abnormal Return (5)
Cumulative Abnormal Return (-4,0)
Ticker
Abnormal Return (-5)
Abnormal Return (-4)
Abnormal Return (-3)
Abnormal Return (-2)
Abnormal Return (-1)
Abnormal Return (0)
Abnormal Return (1)
Abnormal Return (2)
Abnormal Return (3)
Abnormal Return (4)
Abnormal Return (5)
Cumulative Abnormal Return (-4,0)
Ticker
Abnormal Return (-5)
Abnormal Return (-4)
Abnormal Return (-3)
Abnormal Return (-2)
Abnormal Return (-1)
Abnormal Return (0)
Abnormal Return (1)
Abnormal Return (2)
Abnormal Return (3)
Abnormal Return (4)
Abnormal Return (5)|Cumulative Abnormal Return (-4,0)
KIM2
0.710%
-0.609%
1.026%
0.743%
1.733%
-2.570%
-1.651%
-0.537%
0.810%
-0.186%
-0.867%
0.323%
TCO4
1.085%
1.208%
0.154%
-2.663%
-1.525%
0.264%
0.968%
-3.075%
-2.886%
2.274%
-3.020%
-2.561%
SCN3
3.731%
-2.742%
0.061%
-0.618%
1.625%
-0.638%
-0.684%
0.788%
-0.642%
1.574%
-0.681%
-2.312%
PTR2
-0.158%
1.852%
3.134%
-0.058%
0.551%
1.820%
0.417%
0.378%
-0.702%
-0.010%
0.532%
7.300%
DDR2
1.272%
0.001%
1.503%
-0.156%
1.962%
1.408%
0.006%
-0.039%
-0.557%
0.462%
-1.360%
4.717%
NPR2
-0.017%
-1.869%
0.486%
0.981%
0.473%
0.660%
0.470%
1.024%
-0.624%
-0.112%
-1.304%
0.731%
UDR2
0.089%
-0.939%
1.227%
-0.016%
-0.970%
0.938%
0.020%
0.056%
-1.002%
-0.945%
-0.957%
0.240%
FRT2
1.942%
0.426%
1.894%
1.022%
0.703%
2.545%
-0.608%
0.609%
2.232%
0.162%
1.184%
6.591%
AEC2
-1.373%
-3.120%
-0.577%
-0.406%
-0.161%
-2.012%
-2.740%
0.135%
0.335%
0.421%
2.519%
-6.276%
TCO2
0.361%
-2.507%
1.864%
-1.556%
0.913%
-0.431%
0.763%
2.356%
1.265%
0.234%
0.754%
-1.717%
WRP2
0.779%
0.090%
-0.145%
-0.525%
-0.028%
0.090%
-0.137%
0.198%
-0.038%
-0.246%
0.085%
-0.518%
MRY2
0.239%
-0.927%
-0.167%
-1.625%
-0.171%
0.054%
1.067%
1.047%
0.443%
0.123%
1.166%
-2.837%
TCO3
-0.755%
1.021%
6.522%
-1.401%
0.616%
-2.948%
-0.856%
-0.310%
0.527%
-0.233%
0.046%
3.810%
SCN2
0.228%
1.600%
-0.562%
1.114%
-0.782%
0.279%
-0.605%
0.263%
1.030%
1.783%
-0.573%
1.650%1
SPK2
-0.163%
-0.712%
0.086%
-0.192%
0.955%
-0.047%
-1.134%
-0.155%
-0.478%
-0.214%
1.552%
0.089%
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